Motivation
There are some parts of Africa and Asia where modern factories are rare even today, where most local manufactures are still produced by artisans in small shops, and where only the minority live in cities. But in some parts of the poor periphery modern industrialization started more than a century ago. Latin America had two emerging industrial leaders in the late 19 th and early 20 th century -Brazil and Mexico, East Asia had two -Japan and Shanghai, and the European periphery had at least three -Catalonia, the north Italian triangle and Russia. This paper will show that some of these periphery industrializers were growing fast enough to have started catching up on the established industrial leaders (Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom). It will also
show that the pace greatly accelerated in the interwar decades: many more joined the catching up club -Argentina, Colombia, Greece, India, Italy, Korea, Manchuria, Peru, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Turkey; and the overall rates of industrial output growth accelerated even for the leading periphery industrializers -most notably, Brazil, Japan, Mexico and Russia. Why did it start in the half century 1870-1913 (long before the Third World growth miracles of the late 20 th century) and why in these places? Why did the spread of the industrial revolution to the poor periphery accelerate so dramatically in the interwar years? What were the main forces driving the diffusion of modern industry?
No doubt the answers are as complex as any question dealing more generally with the causes of modern economic growth, and no doubt any answer should include fundamentals like culture, geography, institutions and good government. There is, of course, a simpler explanation that would appeal to the growth theorist: As the Great Divergence took place, labor became increasingly expensive in the industrial core relative to the poor periphery. Thus, the poor periphery became increasingly competitive in laborintensive manufacturing. Here's another simpler explanation: a sharp fall in the poor periphery's terms of trade (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950) , after a dramatic rise up to late 19 th century peaks (Williamson 2008, forthcoming) , and thus a sharp rise in the relative price of manufactures, favored home manufactures. Here's a third simple explanation:
trade and exchange rate policy changed dramatically in favor of import-competing manufactures. And here's a fourth simple explanation: those poor countries scarce in manufacturing intermediates and the coal to run their steam engines, found these disadvantages vis a vis well endowed industrial powers evaporating as world markets delivered those intermediates at cheaper prices. In all four cases, global forces had a chance to shine.
But why do I care so much about industrialization when the rest of the recent development/history literature has been content with GDP per capita and proxies for same? 1 The answer is that I believe that industry and cities are carriers of growth. There are at least six decades of theory that strongly supports my belief. Certainly the new endogenous growth theories (e.g. Krugman 1981 Krugman , 1991a Krugman , 1991b Krugman and Venables 1995; Romer 1986 Romer , 1990 Lucas 2009 ) imply that urban-industrial activities contain far more cost-reducing and productivity-enhancing forces than do traditional agriculture and traditional services. This notion is so embedded in mainstream economic thinking that it gets important exposure in modern surveys of growth theory (e.g. Helpman 2004: Chp. 5). Indeed, how else can industrialization -that is, an increase in the share of economic activity based in industry -take place without more rapid rates of total factor productivity growth there? After all, it is relatively rapid productivity advance in industry that lowers its relative costs and prices, raises demand for its output, pulls resources from other less dynamic sectors to augment its capacity to meet that increased demand, and makes it expand in relative size. Thus, given that industry achieves much higher growth rates during the industrial revolution than do other sectors, GDP growth rates quicken as the dynamic sector pulls up the average. And as industry grows in relative importance, its impact on overall GDP growth rates rises as well. The explanations offered for this asymmetric effect favoring rapid productivity growth in urban industry are many. Here are just five: urban clusters foster agglomeration economies; denser urban product and factor markets imply more efficient markets; a more skill-intensive industry and its modern support services fosters the demand for and accumulation of skills; a denser urban-industrial complex tends to generate a more extensive productivity-enhancing knowledge transfer between firms; and industrial firms can draw on technological best practice used by world leaders.
The historical evidence certainly confirms the theory. Figure 1 plots the correlation, both in logs, between GDP per capita observed between 1820 and 1950 (Maddison 2001 , and the level of industrialization per capita 50 or 70 years earlier (Bairoch 1982) . The correlation is steep and strongly significant implying that faster future growth is correlated with current levels of industrialization. This paper measures industrial or manufacturing output growth in the poor periphery over the short century 1870-1940. It does it in three parts, roughly two decades each: 1870-1890, 1890-1913 and 1920-1940 . It also compares the growth performance with that of the industrial leaders --Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom --to identify who was catching up, who was just keeping even, and who was falling Appendix 1 reports the sources of the output growth rate estimates and Appendix 2 does the same for labor productivity. What about catching up on the industrial leaders, Germany, the US and the UK? Table 3 reports the answer. Between 1870 and 1890, only Latin American industry was 5 Thus, the evidence from this sample is not always consistent with the conventional wisdom: "The imperialist powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generally tried to use their colonies as markets for their manufactured goods and as stable sources of raw materials for their industrial production. Combined with their colonies' initial poverty, these imperial policies deterred the growth of manufacturing in most colonies" (Kim and Park 2008: p. 26 Part of this impressive surge in catching up in the interwar can be traced, of course, to the slowdown in output growth among the three leaders due to the great depression (a 0.67
Industrial Catching Up
percentage point drop in their average growth rates from 3.84 in 1890-1913 to 3.17 in 1920-1940) . But in the Middle East and Asia, most of the catch up surge was due to an acceleration in the poor periphery itself. And in the European periphery and Latin America, the depression-induced fall in manufacturing growth rates was much less than with the three leaders. In any case, the biggest industrial growth rate surge between the two periods 1890-1913 and 1920-1940 took place in the following six (where the figures are changes in annual growth rates between the two periods, and where the rates are relative to the three leaders: from 
How to Identify the Sources of Industrialization
As Figure 2 shows, manufacturing output growth (relative to the three leaders)
was not correlated with GDP per capita between 1870 and 1940 (R 2 = 0.002). Whatever were the fundamentals that determined GDP per capita -culture, geography or institutions, they did not spill over in to rates of industrialization. So, what does explain where and when manufacturing growth was fastest in the poor periphery?
For me, the best way to attack this question is to lay out explicitly the determinants of manufacturing profitability and competitiveness. To state the obvious, profits per unit of output equal revenue less costs per unit of output, and a rise in manufacturing output growth should be driven by an increase in those profits. Consider the following statement, with t = time period (1870-1890, 1890-1913, 1920-1940) To the extent that I am mainly interested in the timing of industry growth between each of the three periods 1870-1890, 1890-1913 and 1920-1940 , it is the first difference in prices and costs (c) driving changes in profits that mattered. Thus, dπ = dp -dc = dp -d{wl + uk + p m m + p f f}
In rates of change (*), dπ/π = dp/p-dc/c = dp/p -{φ l w* + φ k u* + φ m p m * + φ f p f *} -
The last term of expression (3) measures total factor productivity growth, where falling input coefficients (l, k, m, f) imply positive total factor productivity growth rates which reduce costs, raise competitiveness, and improve profitability. Since very few countries in the poor periphery 1870-1940 offer estimates of manufacturing or industrial total factor productivity growth, I use industry labor productivity growth as a proxy in what follows.
How do I drape interpretive economic history on equation (3)? Here's the list: dp/p: I assume all poor periphery countries in my sample were much too small to have influenced world manufacturing prices, and thus that they were price takers for those products. Three forces would have served to raise the domestic price of manufactures: a fall in the terms of trade facing these primary product exporters and manufactures importers; a depreciation in their real exchange rates; and a rise in their tariffs (and nontariff barriers) on manufactures.
φ l w*: Any fall in the home wage, compared with foreign competitors, would have lowered relative costs and raised relative profitability. As the great divergence between the industrial leaders and the poor periphery widened, it was manifested by bigger wage and living standard gaps. Those countries whose GDP per capita was falling behind fastest, at least had the increasing advantage of cheaper labor. This was especially true, of course, in labor-intensive manufacturing where φ l was high.
φ k u*: Since the user cost of capital has a financial and a real component, ip k , both might have mattered. As their financial capital markets integrated with world markets, and as these 'emerging markets' underwent a fall in the premium they had to pay for external finance, their interest rates should have fallen compared to their foreign competitors. Before we press on to the empirical analysis, I need to make a qualifying comment about equation (3). The theory there implies that I should correlate changes in output growth between the three periods (driven by changes in profitability) with changes in the explanatory variables. It might be argued, however, that levels of output growth should be correlated with levels of the explanatory variables, and such correlations would augment the sample. We will try both in what follows.
What Mattered Most? An Early Exploration
This section is labeled 'an early exploration' since it consists of a simple bivariate approach rather than a more complex multivariate assessment, and it is based on an very incomplete data set documenting competing explanatory variables. A more complete version will have to await additional documentation of some of the explanatory variables, and a completely new documentation of others.
Productivity Growth?
Let me start with the role of productivity growth and the reminder that labor productivity growth is being used as a proxy for tfpg. Figure 3a reports the correlation between manufacturing output growth less that of the three leaders (MOG-3) and manufacturing labor productivity growth less that of the three leaders (MLPG-3), both in percent per annum and averaged over each of the three periods. While the correlation is certainly positive and significant (R 2 =0.256), it still leaves a lot to be explained, namely the role of world markets, world transport costs, local labor costs, domestic trade policy, and domestic exchange rate policy. 8 This is even more true when changing MOG-3 between any two periods is correlated with changing MLPG-3, as in Figure 3b (R 2 = 0.147). Productivity growth catch-up contributed to output growth catch-up between 1870 and 1940, but other forces affecting output price and input costs did too.
Cheaper Labor?
Many forces were at work over these three periods, but we should see some positive correlation between rising industrial growth rates relative to the leaders, d(MOG-3), and falling labor costs per unit of output relative to the leaders, or, as we see in Figure   4a , a negative correlation with the first differences in the GDP per capita proxy, d(GDPpc/3). The correlation is R 2 = 0.174, about the same as the correlation with changing productivity growth. However, when levels are correlated with levels in Figure   4b , the R 2 drops, suggesting that the next phase the analysis should use country fixed effects to the extent that the focus is timing, in which case ever-cheaper labor is likely to play a part in any explanation of the timing of industrialization in the poor periphery before 1940.
Tariff Protection?
High average tariffs meant even higher tariffs on finished manufactures in the poor periphery, perhaps two or three times higher. 
Terms of Trade?
9 See, for example, Bairoch (1993) forthcoming: Chp. 12), they must have undergone 're-industrialization' and 'Dutch recovery' during the terms of trade bust from the 1870s to the 1930s. We shall see whether the data confirm this hypothesis in the next version of this paper.
Real Exchange Rates?
The standard view is that real exchange rates were stable during the gold standard era up to World War I. Although this standard view is based on Euro-centric evidence, Table 4 confirms it for the poor periphery as well. True, there are many empty cells in Balkan Economic History, 1550 -1950 : From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1982 , Table 2 .7, p. 69; manufacturing output 1927 -1938 from Lampe and Jackson (1982 ), Table 12.14, p. 484. Industrial labor force 1910 -1930 from Lampe and Jackson (1982 , Table 10 . 4, p. 336 and 1927 -1938 from Lampe and Jackson (1982 , Table 11 .12, pp. 419-20, and Table 12 .15, p.
485.
Greece: Industrial production and employment in manufacturing and construction from Brian R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750 -1993 , 4th ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1998 , 1920 -1940 and Japan 1900 and Japan , taken as autonomous 1890 and Japan -1913 . Those without autonomy were either colonies or had signed 'unequal' treaties tying their policy hands, at least regards tariffs. 
